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UNITED STATES v. VOGEL FERTILIZER CO.*
HARMONIZING WITH CONGRESS: THE
COURT REQUIRES THE
TREASURY TO TUNE UP
Congress has granted corporations a limited surtax exemption on initial amounts of income.1 While intended to ease the
tax burden on small businesses, all corporations received this
exemption. 2 Business entities, however, often conduct their activities through multiple corporate structures even though they
are, in fact, a single enterprise. 3 The result is multiple surtax
exemptions, and tax benefits not intended by Congress. 4 To correct the problem, Congress passed section 1561 of the Internal
Revenue Code, which limits certain affiliated corporations to
one exemption among them. 5 Section 1563 (a) (2) of the Internal
Revenue Code, as revised by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, enumerates a twofold, mechanical, stock-ownership test that determines whether affiliated corporations belong to a type of group
that is allowed only a single surtax exemption. 6 In United States
v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 7 the United States Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether a Treasury Department regulation
interpreting the statutory test was valid;8 the Court held the reg* 455 U.S. 16 (1982).
1. Hearingson the Subject of Tax Reform Before The House Committee
on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5050, 5385 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings].
2. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprintedin 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1313, 1426.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. I.R.C. § 1561 (1982).
6. BROTHER-SISTER CONTROLLED GROUP.-Two or more corporations if 5 or fewer persons who are individuals, estates, or trusts
own (within the meaning of subsection (d) (2)) stock possessing(A) at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 80 percent of the total value
of shares of all classes of the stock of each corporation, and
(B) more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote or more than 50 percent of the total
value of shares of all classes of stock of each corporation, taking into
account the stock ownership of each such person only to the extent
such stock ownership is identical with respect to each such corporation.
I.R.C. § 1563 (1982).
7. 455 U.S. 16 (1982).
8. Id. at 19.
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ulation invalid as an unreasonable interpretation of the statute. 9
In Vogel, two closely-held corporations were also interrelated. Vogel Fertilizer Company was owned by Arthur Vogel
and Richard Crain; Vogel owned 77.49% of the company stock
and Crain owned the remaining 22.51%.10 Vogel also owned
87.5% of the stock of Vogel Popcorn Company. 1 Crain, however, did not own any stock in Vogel Popcorn. 12 Between 1973
and 1975, the two companies treated themselves as members of
an affiliated corporate group, called a "brother-sister controlled
group,"'13 in accordance with Treasury Regulation section 1.15631(a) (3). 14 In accordance with the regulation, they did not claim
a full surtax exemption during this period. 15 In 1976, the regulation was held invalid by the Tax Court. 16 Vogel Fertilizer then
9. Id. at 26.
10. Id. at 20.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.

14. Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1 (a) (3) (1973). The regulation used basically the
same words as the section it interpreted. It added, however, the key phrase
"singly or in combination" when showing how five or fewer persons could
own stock in a brother-sister controlled group. The phrase clarified the ambiguity of I.R.C. § 1563(a) (2) by expanding it to allow any number of corporations that were owned by any five persons to be considered for the test.
The test could then be applied to the corporations even though there was no
mutuality of ownership.
15. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 61, 21 (1982).
16. Fairfax Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798 (1976), rev'd,
548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977). Fairfax involved
two Virginia corporations, both located in Fairfax, and both primarily involved in the wholesaling of auto parts. Fairfax Auto Parts of Northern Virginia, Inc. (NOVA), was owned by William Herbert who owned 55% of the
stock, and Herbert's brother-in-law, Joseph Ofano, who owned 45% of the
stock. Ofano was responsible for the operation of NOVA. Fairfax Auto
Parts, Inc. (FAP), was owned totally by William Herbert; Ofano was not
involved in the management of FAP. 65 T.C. at 800. The Commissioner contended that the two corporations were a brother-sister controlled group in
accordance with I.R.C. § 1563(a) (2) and Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a) (3). 65 T.C.
at 801. Applying the test of § 1563(a) (2), as viewed by the government, the
relationship of the two corporations looked like this:

CORPORATIONS
FAP

NOVA

IDENTICAL
OWNERSHIP

Herbert
Ofano

100%
-0-

55%
45%

55%
-0-

Total

100%

100%

55%

INDIVIDUALS

The two corporations were within both steps of § 1563(a) (2)'s test.
The taxpayers argued that the 80% test could only be applied to shareholders who owned stock in both corporations. 65 T.C. at 802. In their view,
the relationship of the two corporations appeared to be:
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ified for a refund, claiming that it and Vogel Popcorn were not
members of a brother-sister controlled group 17 and that each
corporation was therefore entitled to a separate surtax exempCORPORATIONS
INDIVIDUALS

IDENTICAL

FAP

NOVA

OWNERSHIP

Herbert
Ofano

100%
-0-

55%
45%

55%
-0-

Total

100%

55%

55%

In the taxpayer's view, the corporations could not be part of a brother-sister
controlled group because, counting the stock owned by shareholders in
both corporations, the requirements of the 80% test were not met. Id. To
meet the 80% test, either Ofano would have had to own at least one share in
FAP or Herbert would have had to own 80% of the stock in NOVA. If either
proved to be the case, the relationships of the corporations would have
been:

CORPORATIONS
INDIVIDUALS

FAP

Herbert
Ofano

99%
1%

Total

100%

NOVA

IDENTICAL
OWNERSHIP

55%
45%

55%
1%

100%

56%

......................................................................................................

or...
Herbert
Ofano

100%
-0-

80%
20%

80%
-0-

Total

100%

80%

80%

NOVA and FAP appear to have a close relationship. They are in the same
business, are located in the same city, and the owner and secretary of FAP
were, respectively, the president and secretary of NOVA. 65 T.C. at 800.
Herbert controlled both corporations through his majority stock ownership
of each. This close relationship gives a subjective appearance of brothersister corporations, and NOVA and FAP have the "close horizontal relationship between two or more corporations" that Justice Brennan considered a
statutory requirement in Vogel. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455
U.S. 16, 25 (1982). The fact that FAP and NOVA looked like a brother-sister
controlled group might have been why the Court denied certiorariwhen the
taxpayers appealed the circuit court's reversal of the Tax Court ruling. 434
U.S. 904 (1977). The Vogel Court did not discuss why it had denied ceriorari
in Fairfax, yet six years later arrived at the same conclusion as the overruled Tax Court, but Justice Brennan did use the Tax Court's reasoning to
bolster his own. 455 U.S. at 21, 25, 33.
17. Vogel's interpretation of how the statutory test should be applied to
both companies was the following-

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 16:601

tion for each year.18 The IRS disallowed the claim and Vogel
Fertilizer sued for a refund in the Court of Claims. 19 Judgment
was rendered in favor of Vogel and the regulation was declared
invalid to the extent that it differed with the Court of Claims'
20
interpretation of the statute.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari2 1 in order to resolve a conflict among the circuits on the issue of the
regulation's construction.22 The Court affirmed the decision of

INIVIDUAS

CORPORATIONS
VOGEL
VOGEL
POPCORN
FERTILIZER

IDENTICAL
OWNERSHIP

Vogel
Crain

77.49%
22.51%

87.5%
-0-

77.49%
-0-

Total

77.49%

87.5%

77.49%

This interpretation would not allow a finding of a brother-sister controlled
group because the 80% test was not satisfied; less than 80% of the stock of
Vogel Fertilizer is owned by shareholders in Vogel Popcorn.
Treasury Regulation § 1.1563-1(a) (3) interpreted and applied the test
like this:

CORPORATIONS
VOGEL
FERTILIZER

VOGEL
POPCORN

IDENTICAL
OWNERSHIP

Vogel
Crain

77.49%
22.51%

87.5%
-0-

77.49%
-0-

Total

100.00%

87.5%

77.49%

INDIVIDUALS

Both tests as interpreted by the Treasury regulation have been met. Two
persons own more than 80% of the stock of both corporations and, counting
only those shares held identically, more than 50% of the stock in both corporations is held by one of those two persons.
Vogel Fertilizer and Vogel Popcorn do not appear to have as strong an
interrelationship as did the companies in FairfaxAuto Parts. See supra
note 16. Although the Vogel companies were located in the same state and
had the same majority shareholder, they were involved in two totally different lines of business. No evidence was presented that indicated they had
the same officers, board of directors, or any common elements.
18. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 21 (1982).
19. Id.

20. Vogel Fertilizer Co. v. United States, 634 F.2d 497 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
21. 450 U.S. 994 (1981).
22. The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits had upheld the regulation.
Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1980); T.S. Hunt, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 562 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1977); Fairfax Auto Parts, Inc., v. Commissioner, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904
(1977). The Fifth Circuit invalidated Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a) (3) in so far as
it permitted the 80% requirement to be satisfied without common ownership. Delta Metalforming Co. v. Commissioner, 632 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1980).
The Tax Court continually adhered to its view that the regulation was
invalid.
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the Court of Claims in a seven to two vote. 23 Writing for the
Court, Justice Brennan first considered the proper standard for
determining whether a Treasury regulation is a valid interpretation of the Code. 24 Generally, the Court will defer to an agency
regulation if it implements the mandate of Congress in any reasonable manner. 25 This principle, however, was described as
merely setting the framework for subsequent analysis; it is refined by whether the type of authority granted to the agency is
specific or general. 26 The regulation in question in Vogel was
written under a general authority 27 and was therefore given less
deference by the courts than one issued under a specific authority.28 Furthermore, when, as here, the statute has defined a term
with "considerable specificity", a regulation interpreting that
term is less appropriate than if a vague or general 29 term had
30
been used.
Justice Brennan went on to analyze regulation section
1.1563-1 (a) (3) and its interpretation of the statute. The regulation used a funnel approach to interpret the two-step statutory
test. 31 It first looked for multiple corporations that are owned by
up to five persons in the agregate without requiring that each of
the five persons own shares in each corporation. The set of
shareholders must own 80% of each corporation. Then, for the
second step of the test, the regulation counted only those numbers of shares which were owned in identical quantities by each
shareholder in each corporation. This second step of the test is
a control test. 32 It determines if the corporations can be
23. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982) (Berger, C.J.,
Brennan, Marshall, O'Connor, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ.joined in
the majority opinion; Blackmun and White, JJ., joined in the dissent).
24. Id. at 24.
25. Id. (quoting United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967)).
26. 455 U.S. at 24. The Court treated the difference between the two
types of agency authority and the deference they are granted by the courts
as if it were a new innovation in the law, yet the principle is one that is
engrained in case law. See infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
27. I.R.C. § 7805 (1982).
28. 455 U.S. at 24.
29. The principle that an interpretive regulation is justified when a statute uses a general term stems from Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344
(1935), in which the Court considered the validity of an interpretive Treasury regulation. The Revenue Act of 1926 provided that the term "corporations" included associations. Id. at 349. A Treasury regulation then
interpreted "associations" to include certain trusts. Id. at 353. The Court
concluded that because the term "associations" was not defined in the statute, the Treasury was authorized to provide rules for the enforcement of the
section. Id. at 354.
30. See 455 U.S. at 24.
31. See supra note 14.
32. Thomas, Brother-SisterMultiple Corporations- The Tax Reform Act
of 1969 Reformed by Regulation, 28 TAx. L REv. 65, 79 (1972).
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manipulated as one economic entity by one small group of
shareholders. 33 The taxpayer, Vogel, differed with the Treasury
over the construction of the test's first step, 34 arguing that each
of the shareholders must own stock in each corporation before
the first step of the test could be applied. 35 Vogel considered the
test's second step a protective device designed to ensure that
the corporations identified in the first step were controlled as a
single entity.36 Vogel also considered the control test to be less
38
37
important than the 80% test. The Court agreed with Vogel.
The Court first considered whether the regulation was in
harmony with the statutory language. 39 Noting the ambiguity of
the statute, Justice' Brennan determined that the language and
grammatical structure were in closer harmony with the taxpayer's interpretation that common ownership is required by
step one of the test.40 The Court then faced the issued of
whether the regulation conformed with the congressional intent
41
as expressed in the legislative history.
Justice Brennan found that the legislative history of section
42
1563(a) (2) resolved the ambiguity of the statutory language.
The original version of the section was enacted in 196443 and
consisted of a one-step test that was the equivalent of the first
step in the present test." It required that a single person own all
the corporations in the group.45 In 1969, Congress broadened
the test by: 1) including corporations owned by up to five per33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 80.
See supra note 17.
See supra note 17.
Brief for Respondent at 6, United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455

U.S. 16 (1982).
37. Id. Cf. Thomas, supra note 32, at 81.
38. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982).

39. Id. at 24. See also infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
40. 455 U.S. at 25. Justice Brennan determined that the term "five or
fewer persons" was the "conjunctive subject" of both tests and that this

grammatical structure implied a common-ownership requirement. Id. at 25
n.8, 25, 26 (quoting Fairfax Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798, 803
(1976)). See supra note 6.

41. 455 U.S. at 26.
42. Id.
43. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 235(a), 78 Stat. 116 (current
version at I.R.C. § 1563(a) (2) (1982)).

The 1964 version states:

(a) (2) Brother-Sister Controlled Group.-Two or more corporations if

stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power

of all classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 80 percent of the total
value of shares of all classes of stock of each of the corporations is
owned (within the meaning of subsection (d) (2)) by one person who is
an individual, estate or trust.
I.R.C. § 1563(a) (2) (1964).
44. 455 U.S. at 28.
45. See supra note 43.
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sons; and 2) adding the second part of the test.4 Justice Brennan reasoned that since the present version of the statute was
an expansion of the old one, the portion that was common to
both must have been intended by Congress to be the primary
test.47 The original test required stock ownership by a single
person in all the corporations. 48 The expansion, therefore, must
require stock ownership in each corporation by all shareholders
now. 49 Furthermore, it was the Treasury Department which had
proposed the statutory expansion to Congress, and it had submitted examples to explain the change.5 0 In each of the exam5
ples, all of the shareholders owned stock in each corporation. '
The regulation's interpretation of the test was incompatible with
the Treasury's representation to Congress.5 2 The Court concluded that Vogel's interpretation of section 1563(a) (2) was the
one intended by Congress, as indicated by the legislative
53
history.
The immediate importance of Vogel to the corporate taxpayer and his attorney are the practical economic consequences
of the Court's interpretation of the statute.M Perhaps more important to the legal community, however, is the method of analysis employed by the Court in Vogel to determine the validity of
the regulation. The Vogel decision has important implications
to all tax disputes because the taxpayer's interpretation of a
statute prevailed over the Commissioner's. This note will briefly
examine the legislative intent underlying section 1563(a) (2).55
More importantly, it will compare the Vogel Court's method of
determining the legislative intent of ambiguous code sections
with more traditional statutory analysis.
Determining the legislature's intent is the primary method a
court uses when it seeks to determine if an agency regulation
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

I.R.C. § 1563(a) (2) (1982). See supra note 6.
455 U.S. at 29.
Id. at 28. See supra note 43.
455 U.S. at 30.
Id. at 28. See Hearings,supra note 1, at 5170, 5395.
See Hearings,supra note 1, at 5170, 5395.
455 U.S. at 31, 32.

53. Id.

54. See Golub &Weber, What Supreme Court'sLiberal Decision on Controlled GroupsMeans to Practitioners,10 TAXATION FOR LAWYERS 352 (1982).

The authors suggest that greater flexibility in corporate planning without
forfeiting tax benefits will result. Id. They recommend that corporations
who are now members of a brother-sister controlled group restructure
themselves to escape the test. Id. at 355. The authors also predict more
surtax exemptions and related benefits. Id. at 356.
55. See supra note 6.
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implementing the statute is valid.5 6 The Court correctly concluded that Congress expressed its desire to end with section
1563(a) (2) multiple surtax exemptions granted to corporations
controlled by the same small group of people.5 7 It is the scope
that Congress intended for the test that was in dispute. 58 The
primary difficulty in establishing Congress' intent is that the
Treasury Department's proposed change was passed without
discussion. 59 Only the Treasury's explanation, supplemented
with examples, is available for examination in the legislative
history. 60 Thus, Justice Brennan's "cheerful"6 1 declaration that
the legislative history resolves all ambiguity in the statutory lan62
guage is subject to criticism as a substantial overstatement.
The Court either ignored or glossed over several factors which
make the legislature's intent less certain.
Both the physical structure and a natural reading of the
statute suggest that common ownership is required only for the
second part of the test;63 the common-ownership language is
buried within the definition of the second test.64 A section of the
committee hearings also indicates that common ownership is
linked only to the control test.65 The position that common own56. Lane, Attacking the Regulations, 52 A.B.A.J. 187, 189 (1966). See also

Colgate-Palmolive.Peet Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 422, 429 (1943) (Treasury regulation interpreting ambiguous statutory language concerning domestic oil processing upheld).
57. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 26 (1982). See also
id. at 36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See generally H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., 98, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS 1746-47;
Thomas, supra note 32; Note, The Brother-Sister Controlled Group Under
LR.C. § 1563(a)(2), 67 VA. L. REV. 751, 762-63 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Brother-SisterControlled Group 1.
58. Libin & Abromowitz, Multiple corporations:A surprisinginterpretation of Sec. 1563(a)(2) in temporary regulations, 2 TAx ADviSOR 326, 330

(1971).

59. See generally Hearings,supra note 1.
60. Id.
61. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 36 (1982) (Black-

mun, J., dissenting).
62. Id. See also Hoffman, The 80 Percent Ownership Test For BrotherSister Controlled Groups: The Controversy Continues, 58 TAXES 329, 332
(1980); Libin & Abramowitz, supra note 58. See generally White, The Tax

Reform Act of 1969: Demise of Multiple Surtax Exemptions-When Too
Much of a Good Thing Proved Its Own Undoing, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1353

(1970).

63. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 36 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also Delta Metalforming Co. v. Commissioner, 632
F.2d 442, 451 (5th Cir. 1980) (Johnson, J., dissenting); Allen Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 336, 339 (2d Cir. 1980); T.L. Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner,
562 F.2d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 1977); Fairfax Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65
T.C. 798, 812 (1976) (Simpson, J., dissenting). See generally Vogel Fertilizer
Co.v. United States, 634 F.2d 497, 514 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (Smith, J., dissenting).
64. See supra note 6.
65. Hearings,supra note 1, at 5394.
However, in order to insure that this expanded definition of brothersister controlledgroup applies only to those cases where thefive orfewer
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ership is required only by the control test seems to follow. 66

Another factor favoring the Commissioner's interpretation
is that Congress must have been aware of the regulation and its
consequences. Prior to passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 67 the American Bar Association submitted an analysis and criticism of Treasury
Regulation section 1.1563-1(a) (3) to Congress and proposed an
amendment that would force the same construction that the
Court gave it. 68 Additionally, the chairman of the American Bar
Association section on taxation personally discussed the proposed changes with the chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee. 69 ERISA specifically referred to section 1563(a) (2)
and controlled groups of corporations, 7 0 so the section was in
the congressional mind. Yet Congress did nothing. It also did
nothing when it passed the Revenue Act of 197871 which
amended section 1561 and limited the availability of multiple tax
benefits to controlled corporations.7 2 The legislative inaction
individuals hold their 80 percent in a way which allows them to operate
the corporationsas one economic entity, the proposal would add an additional rule that the ownership of the five or fewer individuals must
constitute more than 50 percent of the stock of each corporationconsidering, in this test of ownership, stock of a particularperson only to the
extent that it is owned identically with respect to each corporation.
Fairfax Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798, 809 (Simpson, J., dissenting) (quoting Hearings,supra note 1, at 5394) (emphasis supplied by
the court). See supra note 16 for a discussion of Fairfax.
66. Hearings, supra note 1, at 5394. Referring to the hearings, Judge
Simpson observed that they clearly showed that different persons may be
taken into consideration when applying the 80% and 50% tests. Furthermore, the explanation that there will be common ownership merely "to a
large extent" among those corporations considered for the 80% test shows
that common ownership is not required. 65 T.C. at 810 (Simpson, J.,
dissenting).
67. I.R.C. § 1015 (1976).
68. Committee Recommendations, 27 TAx LAWYER 813, 817 (1974). The
recommendations added phrasing that required "each of the same 5 or
fewer persons" to own stock in "each corporation" being considered as a
brother-sister controlled group. Id.
69. Worthy, Chairman'sReport, 27 TAx LAwYER 527, 531 (1974).
70. I.R.C. § 1015 (1976).
71. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 152(d), 92 Stat. 2799 (1978). The purpose of the
Act was to reduce taxes and stimulate investment spending in order to increase economic growth. H.R. REP. No. 1445, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6761, 6765. If Congress was
unhappy with the increased tax burden on corporations which resulted
from the Treasury's interpretation of I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2), it could have
amended that section when it passed legislation reducing taxes and intended to stimulate economic activity.
72. I.R.C. § 1561(a) (1978).
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leads to an inference that Congress approved of the regulation
as it stood.
A thorough analytical reading of the legislative history of
section 1563(a) (2) offers many possible interpretations, 73 but
has onty one clear result: the history itself is more ambiguous
than the statute. 74 By merely accepting the Treasury's proposal,
Congress indicated one of two things; it either expressed confidence in the Treasury's competence to expand the test and administer the section, or it intended to accept the Treasury's
solution to the problem. If the former, then it granted the Treasury the equivalent of specific authority to carry out the congressional mandate.7 5 If the latter, then to determine the
congressional intent, one needs to determine the intent of the
Treasury Department. That intent could well be expressed by
the contemporaneous construction7 6 given the statute in Treasury Regulation section 1.1563-1(a) (3).77 The courts, however, interpret only statutes and legislative intent, not agency intent,
and therefore the natural approach is to resort to the standard
78
rules of statutory construction.
73. See generally Bonovitz, Brother-SisterControlled Groups Under Section 1563: The 80 Percent Ownership Test, 28 TAx LAWYER 511 (1975); Hoffman, supra note 62; Thomas, supra note 32; White, supra note 62; BrotherSister Controlled Group, supra note 57.
74. See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 38 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Hoffman, supra note 62, at 332; White, supra
note 62, at 1367.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 81-82.
76. The doctrine of special deference to a contemporaneous agency construction of a statute pervades tax law. Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations,
Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity, 43 TAXES 756, 760 (1965). Regulations
issued concomitantly with the enactment of a statute are presumed to rep-

resent the general understanding of the legislative intent and the statute's
meaning. Id. The doctrine goes as far back as 1827 when the.Court stated:
"In the construction of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those who were called upon to act under the law, and
were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very great

respect.'

Edwards's Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 209 (1827).

The Court recently reaffirmed the doctrine; in National Muffler Dealers
Ass'n v. United States, the Court said that "[a I regulation may have particular force if it is a substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute
by those presumed to have been aware of congressional intent." 440 U.S.

472, 477 (1979). The mere prompt action of the Treasury in interpreting a
statute is given weight by the Court even though a taxpayer's challenge is
Just as prompt. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 422,

6 (1943) (Treasury regulation interpreting ambiguous statutory term per-

taining to domestic oil processing upheld). In Vogel, the Court gave the
contemporaneous-construction doctrine a reverse twist and applied it
against the Treasury. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 31

(1982). For a broad discussion of the doctrine, see 1 MERTENS
TAX §§ 3.20-3.26 (Rev. vol. 1981).

ERAL INCOME

77. See supra note 14.
78. See generally MERTENS, supra note 76, at ch. 3.

LAw OF FED-
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The courts have developed rules and presumptions as aids
in determining legislative intent.7 9 An inspection of those rules
may set the stage for resolving the ambiguity surrounding section 1563(a) (2). Treasury regulations may be either legislative
or interpretive in character.8 0 A legislative regulation is one
written under a specific authority from Congress to supplement
a statute. 81 It has the force of law and is treated as if it was part
83
of the statute. 82 If a legislative regulation is neither ultra vires
nor capricious, 84 then it is valid.85 An interpretive regulation, on
the other hand, is written under a general power8" from Congress to administer a statute.8 7 The courts treat an interpretive
regulation as the mere statement of the Treasury Department's
construction of the statute. 88 The rules of construction are applied both to ambiguous statutes8 9 and to the interpretive regulations defining the statutory meaning. 90 The regulation
challenged in Vogel, written under the Treasury's general power
to administer the Internal Revenue Code, was interpretive and
subject to the rules of construction.
Tax statutes are also subject to their presumptive rules.
Should a statute levying a tax be found ambiguous, it will be
79. Id. at § 3.02.
80. Rogovin, supra note 76, at 758.
81. Id. A legislative regulation derives its authority from a specific delegation of legislative power; it is as if Congress itself had written the regulation. The power to write this type of regulation must be found in the
statute. See Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40
COLum. L. REv.252, 259 (1940).

82. Alvord, supra note 81, at 259.
83. Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARv. L. REV.
398, 401 (1941). If a regulation is outside the authority delegated by Congress, it is invalid. Id.
84. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 426 (1977) (Department of Health,
Education and Welfare regulation determining what constitutes unemployment upheld as reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious).
85. Griswold, supra note 83. See also Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452
U.S. 247, 253 (1981) (interpretive Treasury regulation held invalid as unreasonable when compared with the manifest congressional design and inconsistent with another Treasury regulation). The Court stated that "where
the Commissioner acts under specific authority, our primary inquiry is
whether the interpretation or method is within the delegation of authority."

Id.
86. LR.C. § 7805 (1982).
87. See Alvord, supra note 81, at 260. Cf. Edwards's Lessee v. Darby, 7
U.S. 126 (12 Wheat. 206) (1827).

88. Alvord, supra note 81, at 261. See also Rogovin, supra note 76, at 759.
Cf. Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 16 (1932); Hesselin v. Hoey, 91

F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1937).

89. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. O'Malley, 277 F.2d 128, 134 (8th Cir.
1960) (Treasury regulation held invalid because it interpreted a statute so

that it took away a right clearly granted by Congress).
90. See Alvord, supra note 81, at 261.
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construed in favor of the taxpayer. 9 1 Deductions, conversely,
are granted by legislative grace, 92 do not assess a tax, and are
construed against the taxpayer when ambiguous. 93 This second
rule 94 favors the Treasury regulation. Because Congress has the
constitutional power to tax all income, 95 an exemption is nothing but a limited exclusion from tax liability, similar in effect to a
deduction, 96 granted by legislative grace. 97 Therefore, the statute at issue in Vogel should be construed against the taxpayer
98
as are deductions.
With the presumptions always in the background, two rules
of construction are used to determine if interpretive regulations
follow the legislative intent. The reenactment rule applies to an
interpretive regulation when the statutory section it implements
is reenacted by Congress. 99 The reenactment is often viewed as
congressional approval of the agency's interpretation in the regulation.1°° The reenactment rule may also apply when the regulation's effect has been explained to Congress and Congress has
91. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917) (alimony is not income for
taxation purposes because the statutory section defining net income was

obscure and therefore should be interpreted against the government). See

also United States v. Wigglesworth, 28 F. Cas. 595, 596 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842)
(No. 16,690) (duty imposed on imported indigo not allowed because the
statute levying it was ambiguous and therefore construed against the government). Wiggleworth is apparently the first United States case to articulate this rule of construction.
92. Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943)
(disallowal of deduction upheld because taxpayer did not make clear showing of right to the deduction). See also New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering,
292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934) (taxpayer found not entitled to deduction, which is
granted by legislative grace).
93. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 751 (1969) (regulation delineating
"scholarship" upheld; deductions are construed narrowly). See also Parker

Pen Co. v. O'Day, 234 F.2d 607, 609 (7th Cir. 1956) (regulation limiting deduction upheld; statutes creating deductions are construed against the
taxpayer).
94. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
96. This point is best illustrated by comparing the definitions of deduc-

tion and exemption. A deduction, as used in the Internal Revenue Code
§ 1312(2), is "a term of art meaning only those items subtracted, or 'deducted' from gross income in arriving at taxable income... ." B.C. Cook &
Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 584 F.2d 53, 54 (5th Cir. 1978). Similarly, "exempt" merely signifies that a portion of income is excluded from gross income in determining taxable income and that "no tax is payable in the first
instance." William Clairmont, Inc. v. State, 261 N.W.2d 780, 784 (N.D. 1977).

See also Tupelo Garment Co. v. State Tax Commission, 178 Miss. 730, 173
So. 656, 660 (1937) ("deduction [made in determining taxable income] is in

fact an 'exemption' ").
97. Cf. supra note 92.

98. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
99. Rogovin, supra note 76, at 760.
100. Jones v. Goodson, 121 F.2d 176, 180 (10th Cir. 1941) (taxi company
sought refund of social security taxes collected by the I.R.S. under a regula-
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not acted.1° 1 The reenactment rule also favors the Treasury regulation because Congress not only let the regulation stand after
being appraised of its effect, but also passed legislation referring
to the statute. 0 2 One may safely assume that Congress would
have amended section 1563(a) (2) at this time if it disapproved of
10 3
the agency construction.
The most frequently used rule in modern tax law is the
"choice of reasonable interpretations rule." Although interpre°4
tive regulations were originally only entitled to polite respect,'
this respect eventually developed into a rule strongly favoring
Treasury regulations. 105 If more than one reasonable interpretation of a statute was possible, the Commissioner could choose
any one, and it would stand against all attack. 10 6 Courts had difficulty with the word "reasonable," and a secondary test of harA
mony was developed to determine reasonableness. 0 7
with
the
if
it
can
be
read
a
statute
in
harmony
with
regulation is
statute and does not depart from, or put aside, a statutory definition' 0 8 or conflict with congressional design.'0 9
tion later held to be valid under the reenactment rule). See also Alvord,
supra note 81, at 262.
101. Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 313

(1933) (duty assessed by United States Tariff Commission upheld; Congress was informed of regulation's effect and did not take action).
102. See supra note 67-72 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 100-01.
104. Hesselin v. Hoey, 91 F.2d 954, 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 756
(1937) (interpretive Treasury regulation imposing a gift tax held invalid).
See also Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 16 (1932) (ambiguous
Treasury regulation interpreting ambiguous statutory section granted little
deference by the Court); Alvord, supra note 81, at 260.
105. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. O'Malley, 277 F.2d 128, 130 (8th Cir.
1960).
106. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 488
(1979). The Court firmly stated that "It]he choice among reasonable interpretations is for the Commissioner, not the courts." Id.
107. Lynch v. Tilden Produce Co., 265 U.S. 315 (1924). Lynch involved the
statutory definition of adulterated butter and an interpretive regulation
which set a standard for it. Congress defined one of the characteristics of
adulterated butter as manufacture or manipulation with the intent of causing excessive absorption of water. Id. at 319. The Treasury regulation set
an arbitrary standard for maximum permissible water content. Id. at 320.
The Court determined that Congress did not intend for normal amounts of
water used in the manufacturing process to be included in its definition of
adulterated butter. Id. at 321. Intent to cause abnormal absorption was key.
Id. at 320. Because the regulation made water content the sole criterion of
adulteration and did not make allowances for water used in the manufacturing process, it conflicted with the statutory definition. Id. at 321. The

regulation and the statute could not be read in harmony. Id.

108. Id.
109. Cf. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 470 (1900) (Treasury regulation concerning control of department records upheld because taxpayer did
not clearly show that it was totally inappropriate to the end specified in the
statute).
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In the area of affiliated corporations, the congressional design was to expand the test for brother-sister controlled groups
and further limit the availability of surtax exemptions,"10 but
Congress passed an ambiguous statute to obtain this end."' The
regulation fulfilled its primary function by resolving the ambiguity in accordance with the congressional design. 1 2 The Court in
Vogel stated that the taxpayer's interpretation was merely in
closer harmony with the statute than the regulation,"13 thus suggesting that the regulation was also a reasonable interpretation." 4 Since the choice of reasonable interpretations is for the
Commissioner, 11 5 the regulation should stand.
Applying the Court's own rules, one can determine how Vogel should have been decided. Both the presumptions and the
rules of construction applied to tax statutes lead to a result contrary to the Vogel decision. The pertinent question, then, is how
did the Court come to the opposite conclusion?
Justice Brennan relied heavily on National Muffler Dealers
Association, Inc. v. United States"16 and United States v. Correll.1 7 In National Muffler, an interpretive Treasury regulation
defined the general term "business league" in such a way that it
excluded an association of franchised muffler dealers and denied them a tax exemption. 118 The Court reaffirmed both the
harmony requirement,"19 as stated in Lynch v. Tilden Produce
Company, 20 and the policy reasons for allowing any reasonable
interpretation of the Treasury to stand.12 ' The regulation challenged in National Muffler was exactly opposite to the original
regulation promulgated by the Treasury. 122 The Court stated
110. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
111. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 25 (1982). See also
id. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Hoffman, supra note 62; Libin &
Abramowitz, supra note 58.
112. The congressional design was to expand the test and further limit
the number of corporate entities allowed to take a full surtax exemption.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
113. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 25 (1982).
114. Id. at 38 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
115. See supra note 106.
116. 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
117. 389'U.S. 299 (1967).
118. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472
(1979).
119. Id. at 477.
120. 265 U.S. 315 (1924).
121. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472,477
(1979). The Court stated that Congress had delegated authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe regulations to insure that they would be
written by "masters of the subject" who would also be responsible for putting them into effect. Id.
122. Id. at 489 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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that this change of position by the Treasury is permissible because an agency may alter its interpretation of a statute in light
of administrative experience. 123 This statement negates Justice
Brennan's attempt in Vogel to hold the Treasury to the type of
examples it submitted to Congress when proposing section
1563(a) (2).124 National Muffler's principle would allow the
Treasury's interpretation in Vogel to stand because, even if the
original interpretation of the Treasury was the same as the taxpayer's in Vogel, an agency is allowed to change its interpretation in light of administrative experience. 125 In National
Muffler, the Treasury changed its interpretation 1800;126 in Vogel, it merely narrowed and clarified a loophole it did not originally address.
United States v. Correll127 involved an interpretive Treasury
regulation which defined an ambiguous term in a section that
granted a deduction. 128 In upholding the regulation, 129 the
Court relied on the general rule that deductions will be construed in favor of the government. 130 The Court, however, also
included a strong statement that it will not attempt to perfect
the administration of tax laws;' 31 this is the "province of the
Congress and the Commissioner," and any reasonable Treasury
interpretation is valid. 132 Vogel, like Correll, involved an interpretive Treasury regulation 133 that implemented an ambiguous
123. Id. at 485.
124. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 30 (1982).
125. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 485
(1979).

126. Id. at 489 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
127. 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
128. Id. at 304 (statutory phrase "meals and lodging ... not self-defining"; interpretive regulation justified). The Correll Court also reaffirmed
the validity of the reenactment rule. It stated that 'Treasury regulations
and interpretations long continued without substantial change, applying to
unamended or substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to have received congressional approval and have the effect of law." Id. at 305 (quoting Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938)).
129. 389 U.S. at 307.
130. Id. at 304.
131. Id. at 306-07. The Court stated that while alternatives to the regulatory view were available,

we do not sit as a committee of revision to perfect the administration of
the tax laws. Congress has delegated to the Commissioner, not to the
courts, the task of prescribing all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. sec. 7805(a). In
this area of limitless factual variations "it is the province of Congress
and the Commissioner, not the courts, to make appropriate
adjustments."
Id. (quoting Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287 (1967)).

132. Id. at 307.
133. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982).
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section of a statute limiting a tax exemption 3 4 and, possibly,
narrowed the Treasury's construction of the statute. 13 5 If the
principles of Correll were applied to the facts of Vogel, the Commissioner's interpretation of I.R.C. section 1563(a) (2) would
stand because it involves an exemption that should be interpreted in favor of the government, and it is the job of Congress,
not the courts, to fine tune the tax laws. 3 6 Because the ratio-

nales of NationalMuffler and Correll both dictated that the regulation be upheld, these authorities were either misapplied or
not the prime authority for the decision.
Close analysis of the Vogel opinion reveals that Justice
Brennan relied on the spirit of United States v. Cartwright. 37 In
Cartwright, the Court overturned an interpretive regulation
which determined the value of mutual fund shares but which
conflicted with the congressional design manifested in other
statutes.'3 The Cartwright Court stated that the choice-of-reasonable-interpretations rule merely sets the framework for judicial analysis and does not displace it;139 when the Treasury

chooses an interpretation that is consistent with the statute but
is unrealistic, the interpretation should not be allowed to
stand. 14° The principle of Cartwright is that the interpretive
regulation must be the most realistic, or reasonable, of the alternatives to retain validity.
When Justice Brennan relied on National Muffler' 4' and
Correll,142 he had to find the regulation totally unreasonable in
order to declare it invalid. Yet he had already admitted that the
regulation was reasonable, 14 3 although not as reasonable as the
taxpayer's interpretation.'" In reality, Justice Brennan used
the harmony test 1 45 as a weighing test. Stating that reasonable-

ness is determined by harmony, he then picked the interpretation that was in closer harmony,"46 thereby making the choiceof-reasonable-interpretations rule invalid. A Treasury interpretation must now be the most reasonable one available; when
134. Id. at 18.
135. Id. at 25.
136. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967).
137. 411 U.S. 546 (1973).

138.
139.
140.
141.
(1979).
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id. at 550.
Id. at 557.
National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472
United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 25 (1982).
Id.
See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
455 U.S. at 26.
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challenged, the interpretive regulation must be the one that harmonizes most closely with the congressional intent. While it
might not be the province of the courts to perfect the tax laws, it
is now their province to insure that the Treasury is in harmony
with the congressional tune.
This reasoning marks another step in the trend started by
Cartwright,14 7 and is also a return to an older concept. 148 An
interpretive rule is once again merely the government's position.
It will be given respect, but only respect; if disputed, an interpretive regulation will retain validity only if it is more in harmony
with the statute than the interpretation offered by the challenger. The Court's holding in Vogel raises implications for the
taxpaying community as a whole in addition to the corporate
taxpayer. 49 More litigation can be expected as a result of Vogel.
If a taxpayer believes his view of a statute is more reasonable
than the regulatory construction, he is now encouraged to dispute the regulation. In response, Congress may decide to give
147. United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973). Rowan Cos. v.
United States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981) is the second step in the trend. In Rowan,
the Court dealt with two interpretive Treasury regulations that defined the
statutory term "wages" in totally different ways. Id. at 249. One regulation
specifically allowed an employer to exclude the value of certain meal and
lodging benefits when computing employee wages. Id. at 250. The other
regulation required the employer to include the same meal and lodging
benefits when computing employee wages for purposes of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
(FUTA). Id. The Court found that the regulations were unreasonable because Congress defined "wages" in substantially the same manner in the
different acts and, the term should have been interpreted in only one way.
Id. at 263. Although the regulations had been in force since 1940, the Court
did not apply the reenactment rule because the Treasury did not enforce
them in a totally consistent manner until 1957. Id. at 260-61. The regulations that included certain meal and lodging benefits in the computation of
wages for FICA and F'UTA were declared invalid. Id. at 263.
In deciding Rowan, the Court once again considered what standards to
use when determining the validity of a Treasury regulation. Id. at 252. It
included its normal boiler plate language concerning standards used in previous opinions and paid homage to the choice-of-reasonable-interpretations
rule. Id. See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982);
National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979);
United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1967). As in Vogel, the Rowan
Court relied on National Muffler and Correll and therefore had to find the
regulation totally unreasonable in order to declare it invalid. However, the
Court also stated that it looks to see "whether the regulation harmonizes"
with the statute. 452 U.S. at 253. It then said that regulations written under
the Treasury's general authority to promulgate rules are owed less deference than those written under a specific authority. Id. The Rowan Court
essentially took a step away from the choice-of-reasonable-interpretations
rule and a step closer to a position where the court would weigh alternative
interpretations and choose the most reasonable one.
148. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
149. See Golub & Weber, supra note 54.
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the Treasury Department specific authority 150 in more instances
so that it will have greater latitude to administer the tax laws
and lesser interference from the courts. The new stricter standard applied to interpretive regulations' 51 in Vogel may also152reIt
sult in the Treasury using greater care when drafting them.
seems likely, 153 however, that the Treasury, in response to Vogel, will submit a new proposal to Congress which will expand
the test of section 1563(a) (2) 154 to encompass the funnel approach it used in Treasury Regulation section 1.1563-1(a) (3).155
When that happens, Congress will have another opportunity to
name its tune.
Kenneth Kopicki

150. See supra note 81.
151. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
152. Other ambiguous sections of the Internal Revenue Code may also
be affected by the Vogel decision. Welz &Minasian, Supreme Courtin Vogel
Voids I.R.S.' 80% Brother-SisterGroup Test; Wide Impact Seen, 56 J. TAX'N
202, 205 (1982).
153. One Treasury official stated that a new proposal is either now on, or
should be on, the agenda of changes to the Code that will be submitted to
Congress in the future. Conversation with the Honorable John E.
Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, at the John
Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois (October 27, 1982).
154. I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2) (1982). See supra note 6.
155. Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a) (3) (1973). See supra note 14.

